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Abstract It is well-known that societal energy consump-
tion and pollutant emissions from transport are influenced
not only by technical efficiency, mode choice and the
carbon/pollutant content of energy but also by lifestyle
choices and socio-cultural factors. However, only a few
attempts have been made to integrate all of these insights
into systemsmodels of future transport energy demand or
even scenario analysis. This paper addresses this gap in
research and practice by presenting the development and
use of quantitative scenarios using an integrated
transport-energy-environment systems model to explore
four contrasting futures for Scotland that compare
transport-related ‘lifestyle’ changes and socio-cultural
factors against a transition pathway focussing on trans-
port electrification and the phasing out of conventionally
fuelled vehicles using a socio-technical approach. We
found that radical demand and supply strategies can have
important synergies and trade-offs between reducing life
cycle greenhouse gas and air quality emissions. Lifestyle
change alone can have a comparable and earlier effect on
transport carbon and air quality emissions than a transi-
tion to EVs with no lifestyle change. Yet, the detailed
modelling of four contrasting futures suggests that both
strategies have limits to meeting legislated carbon bud-
gets, which may only be achieved with a combined
strategy of radical change in travel patterns, mode and
vehicle choice, vehicle occupancy and on-road driving
behaviour with high electrification and phasing out of
conventional petrol and diesel road vehicles. The new-
found urgency of ‘cleaning up our act’ since the Paris
Agreement and Dieselgate scandal suggests that we can-
not just wait for the ‘technology fix’.
Keywords Transportation energy. Transport systems
modelling . Emissionsmodelling . Socio-technical
approach . Lifestyle change
Introduction
The outcomes of the 2015 Paris Agreement (United
Nations 2015) and the US ‘Dieselgate’1 emissions
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1 While there is no official definition of the term ‘Dieselgate’, it has
become synonymous with the use by the Volkswagen Group of a
‘defeat device’ that detects when a diesel car is undergoing an official
emission tests and optimises engine performance to minimise air
pollutant emissions to meet stringent emissions regulations. The device
is only activated during the official test. Vehicles by other manufac-
turers have also been shown to exceed emissions in real-world driving
conditions; however, there has been no evidence of ‘defeat devices’
being used outside Volkswagen.
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scandal have prompted policy makers, regulators and
industry to re-evaluate strategies to meet climate change
mitigation and air quality goals. Awide range of supply
and demand policies have been proposed at both nation-
al (e.g. graded purchase taxes favouring electric vehi-
cles, scrappage rebates for replacing diesel vehicles with
electric vehicles), subnational (e.g. eco-driving
programmes) and local levels (e.g. phasing out or ban-
ning of diesel/petrol vehicles, air quality driven speed
limits). However, policy implementation has been lag-
ging aspiration, and buyers have so far responded rather
slowly and patchily, in many parts of the world. There
are exceptions, of course, exemplified by the recent dip
in diesel car sales in the UK (a 6% change in market
share from diesel to petrol and plug-in cars between
2016 and 2017), which suggests that change can happen
faster than we might expect and for reasons beyond
price and regulation (e.g. anti-diesel rhetoric, change in
attitudes, delayed purchasing decisions due to market
uncertainty) (SMMT 2018).
It is well-known that transport energy consumption
and related pollutant emissions are influenced not only by
technical efficiency, mode choice, activity levels and the
carbon/pollutant content of energy (EEA 2011; Yang
et al. 2009), but also by the way we live (or ‘lifestyles’2),
socio-cultural factors (e.g. expenditure patterns, localism,
multiple car ownership, (un)acceptability of air travel,
social norms, habits and the ageing population) and,
crucially, by changes in the number of and composition
of the population. As only few attempts have been made
to apply these insights in models of future transport
energy demand (Anable et al. 2012; Chitnis and Hunt
2012; Köhler et al. 2009; Skippon et al. 2016; Weber and
Perrels 2000), there is a methodological gap between the
identified importance of these factors for transport energy
systems and quantitative modelling frameworks.
Electrification of the passenger vehicle and light
goods vehicle fleets is a key strategy and viewed as
necessary to achieve deep decarbonisation and cleaning
up of the transport sector (AEATechnology 2009; CCC
2015; IEA 2011, 2015a; Köhler et al. 2009; OLEV
2013; Sims et al. 2014), but there are concerns that the
pace and extent implied by the underlying modelling
studies are problematic and that assessment of consum-
er, social and market factors have been relatively
neglected (Anable et al. 2012; Graham-Rowe et al.
2012; Leinert et al. 2013; Tran et al. 2012). In the United
Kingdom (UK; national) and Scotland (subnational), for
example, the policy focus on vehicle technology reflects
other global transport modelling exercises that depend
upon between 40 and 90% market penetrations of tech-
nologies such as plug-in hybrid electric (PHEV) and full
battery electric vehicles (BEV) between 2030 and 2050
(CCC 2016; IEA 2015b; Scottish Government 2013c).
Although scenario exercises such as these are used to
explore the potential carbon emission reduction from a
vehicle fleet evolution towards low carbon vehicle tech-
nologies, the main risk is that the full potential and
necessary contribution of lifestyle change, consumption
behaviour and the important role of user attitudes and
perceptions are often overlooked by decision makers.
Other than changes in cost or time preferences required
to facilitate the uptake of low carbon vehicles (Daly
et al. 2014; Dodds and McDowall 2014), many of these
scenario exercises treat other societal developments that
impact on transport as external to the decision making
process (Geels et al. 2017).
Scotland is an interesting case study as it has highly
ambitious and legislated climate change (Scottish
Government 2013c, 2017) and air quality (Scottish
Government 2015) targets, and a sub-national gover-
nance structure (Anderton 2012) that allows subnational
and local policies to be implemented that may go be-
yond UK and EU plans and policies (Melo 2016).
Indeed, existing policies and plans by the Scottish Gov-
ernment include ‘softer’ demand policies (such as
‘smarter choices’ and car and lift sharing) and ‘long-
term reconfiguration of the transport sector’ that are
often ignored (Scottish Government 2013b, c, 2017).
This paper addresses this gap in research and practice
by presenting the development and use of quantitative
scenarios using an integrated transport-energy-
environment systems model to explore four contrasting
futures that compare transport-related lifestyle change
with a low-carbon technology-focussed transition path-
way using a socio-technical approach. A relatively am-
bitious techno-economic-focussed scenario is evaluated
against one in which lifestyle change is shaped by
concerns about the way we travel, how much this im-
pacts on energy use, the environment and our well-being
so that transport energy and emissions are at significant-
ly lower levels by 2050 than in the other pathways
depicting existing policies and plans. By doing so, this
paper aims to answer the questions: How do we go
2 ‘Lifestyles’ are broadly defined by consumption patterns, prefer-
ences, use of time and space, social values and norms, and public
acceptance.
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further (beyond low cost technologies and minimal
behavioural change)? How do we go faster (increasing
the pace of change and innovation, and more ambitious
policy)? Are there synergies and trade-offs to be made
(demand vs supply, climate change vs air quality)? If the
goals of the Paris Agreement3 and the targets of national
and subnational legislation on climate change and air
quality are to be met, more fundamental demand side
changes are necessary (Creutzig et al. 2018). The paper
thus challenges policy, practice and business to consider
the dominant focus on technical solutions for transport.
Approach, methods and data
Study approach
To achieve the above objectives, we first developed a
Scottish version of the UK Transport Carbon Model
(UKTCM), which is a previously developed transport-
energy-environment system modelling framework that
has been applied in a number of scenario (Anable et al.
2012; Brand et al. 2017) and policy (Brand et al. 2013)
modelling studies to date. The resulting Scottish Trans-
port Energy and Air pollution Model (STEAM) is a
disaggregated, bottom-up modelling framework of the
Scottish transport-energy-environment system, built
around a set of exogenous scenarios of socio-economic,
socio-technical and political developments. The model-
ling framework is briefly summarised in the next sec-
tion, with further details published elsewhere (Brand
2010; Brand et al. 2012).
In a second step, STEAM was applied in a Scottish
case study to explore and compare the travel, energy use
and emissions impacts of alternative scenarios of radical
behaviour change vs. a relatively ambitious electrifica-
tion pathway using a socio-technical approach to sce-
nario modelling. This builds on a previous study by
Anable et al. (2012), with a new geographical focus
and new scenario variants and analysis informed by
the more recent literature including Geels et al. (2017)
and Creutzig et al. (2018). We outline the core methods
next before spending some time on describing the sce-
nario narratives and assumptions.
Outline of the core methods
STEAM integrates a transport demand simulation model,
household car ownership model, consumer segmented
vehicle choice model, vehicle stock evolution model
and vehicle and fuel life cycle emissionsmodel in a single
scenario modelling framework. The model projects trans-
port demand and supply, for all passenger and freight
modes of transport, and calculates the corresponding
energy use, life cycle emissions and environmental im-
pacts year-by-year up to 2100 (NB: the time horizon for
this study was 2012 to 2050).
A detailed description is beyond the scope of this paper,
and most of the methods have been published elsewhere
(Brand 2016; Brand et al. 2017, 2012). Briefly, the trans-
port demand model simulates passenger travel demand as
a function of key travel indicators structured around data
obtained from the UK National Travel Survey
(Department for Transport 2016), including the average
number of trips and average distance travelled per person
per year. These were further disaggregated by seven main
trip purposes (commuting, business, long distance leisure,
local leisure, school/education, shopping, other), eight trip
lengths (under 1, 1–2, 2–5, 5–10, 10–25, 25–50, 50–100
and more than 100 mi) and 12 modes of passenger trans-
port (walk, bicycle, car/van driver, car/van passenger, mo-
torcycle, local bus, coach, rail and underground, other
private, taxi, domestic air, other public). International air
travel is modelled separately as a function of income
(GDP/capita), population and supply and policy costs
(Brand 2010; Brand et al. 2012). Freight demand is sim-
ulated as a function economic activity (GDP/capita) and
population, with reference demand elasticities taken from
a RAND Europe study (Dunkerley et al. 2014).
The vehicle stock model provides projections of how
vehicle technologies evolve over time for 770 vehicle
technology categories, including 283 car technologies such
as increasingly efficient gasoline internal combustion ve-
hicles (ICV), battery electric vehicles (BEV) and plug-in
hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV). The car fleet model is the
most detailed, including market (private vs. fleet/company,
three car sizes/segments) and consumer segmentation (four
private and two fleet/company segments). New vehicle
choice is modelled using a hybrid discrete choice and
consumer segmentation model, as described in Brand
et al. (2017). Road freight vehicles come in three sizes/
classes: vans (up to 7.5 t), ‘medium’ trucks (typical 12–24-
t non-articulated truck, intercity and intra-city distribution)
and ‘heavy’ trucks (32–40-t articulated truck, long distance
3 The Paris Agreement established a near universal covenant amongst
world leaders to take action to hold Bthe increase in… temperature to
well below 2 °C … and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature
increase to 1.5 °C^.
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haulage). This is obviously an over-simplification of the
distribution and haulage vehicle fleets, but deemed appro-
priate for a strategic modelling tool that captures the main
fleet categories. Van and truck propulsion system options
include diesel ICV, diesel PHEV, BEV, compressed nat-
ural gas (CNG) ICVand hydrogen (H2) fuel cell electric
vehicle (FCEV).
The energy and emissions model calculates fuel and
energy consumption as well as pollutant emissions for
eight direct pollutants (carbon dioxide, CO2, methane,
CH4, carbon monoxide, CO, sulphur dioxide, SO2, nitro-
gen oxides, NOX, non-methane volatile organic com-
pounds, NMVOC, and particulates, PM) arising from
the operation of vehicles by using the established emis-
sions factor method underlying HBEFA (INFRAS 2009)
and COPERT (EEA 2000, 2012). This is most detailed
for road vehicles, where emissions are based on average-
speed emissions-curves for ‘hot’ emissions as well as
excess emissions from ‘cold starts’ (ibid.). It allows to
model the combined effects of different fleet composi-
tions, different sets of emission factors, traffic character-
istics, cold starts, fuel quality and driver behaviour.
Finally, the life cycle inventorymodel calculates energy
use and emissions (including primary energy and land use)
for the manufacture, maintenance and disposal of vehicles;
the construction, maintenance, and disposal of infrastruc-
ture; and the supply of energy (fuels). This adds 18 unregu-
lated air pollutants and land use change indicators. The
environmental impacts assessment model then provides an
assessment of the damage caused by calculating impact
indicators (e.g. globalwarmingpotential) and external costs
(e.g.socialcostofcarbon,ordamagecosts tohumanhealth).
Scenario development: the case of Scotland
We first developed storylines and then quantified these
to yield four core scenarios, as shown in Fig. 1 and
described further in Table 1.
Reference pathway (REF)—key data
and assumptions
STEAM was calibrated to Scottish national statistics for
the year 2012 (DfT 2014). We obtained Special Licence
Access to the National Travel Survey dataset (Department
for Transport 2016) and used SPSS v23 to derive average
trip rates, distance travelled and mode splits for Scotland.
Due to the smaller sample size of the Scottish sample, the
travel demand data were pooled over the years 2010, 2011
and 2012. The ‘Reference’ scenario (REF) broadly de-
scribes a projection of transport demand, supply, energy
use and emissions as if there were no changes to transport
and energy policy beyond current policy. It was modelled
using STEAM based on exogenous assumptions and pro-
jections of socio-demographic (incl. demand effects of an
ageing of the population), economic, technological and
(firm and committed) policy developments, including the
recently simplified vehicle road tax and relatively complex
CO2-graded company car tax regimes. Economic growth
data up to 2015 were based on government figures. Future
GDP/capita growth was assumed to average 1.35% p.a. up
to 2050. Transport demand projections were modelled
based on no changes in trip patterns4 (i.e. trips and distance
travelled per person p.a., and mode split) apart from lower
commuting levels due to an ageing population, and aver-
age demand elasticities (of GDP/capita, population and
generalised cost) for international air and freight transport
(Dunkerley et al. 2014; Sims et al. 2014). Fuel price and
retail electricity price projections were based on 2014UK
Government forecasts (DECC 2014). Annual road tax
and road fuel duties were assumed to remain constant at
2017 levels.
Pre-tax vehicle purchase costs were kept constant
over time for established technologies and gradually
decreased for advanced and future technologies, thus
exogenously simulating improvements in production
costs, economies of scale and market push by manufac-
turers.5 For example, average purchase prices for BEV
cars were assumed to decrease by 2.8% pa from 2015 to
2020, by 1.6% pa until 2030 and 0.6% pa until 2050,
based on projected BEV battery cost reductions
(Nykvist and Nilsson 2015). The Reference scenario
further assumed gradual improvements in specific fuel
consumption and tailpipe CO2 emissions per distance
travelled (see Supplementary Materials in Brand et al.
2017). The rates of improvement were based on tech-
nological innovation driven entirely by market compe-
tition, not on policy or regulatory push.6 Fuel
4 This applies to the Reference case only. Average distance travelled
varies by propulsion technology (e.g. diesel cars travel further per year
than petrol or EV cars, based on national statistics).
5 The assumption that alternative technologies improve (cost, energy
and environmental performance, consumer preferences) at a faster rate
over time applies equally to all scenarios modelled here, not just the
reference scenario.
6 This implies that the EU mandatory agreement on new car CO2
emissions would not be met. However, separating innovation by com-
petition and innovation by regulation/policy push is slightly arbitrary
here, as the effects are never easy to untangle.
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consumption and CO2 improvement rates for future car
vintages were assumed to be 1.5% p.a.—a somewhat
lower and more conservative rate than the average rate
of 4% p.a. based on test-cycle data for all new cars
between 2008 and 2013 (NB: ‘real-world’ improve-
ments have been significantly lower, as shown by ICCT
(2016) and others). Indirect emissions from fuel supply
and vehicle manufacture, maintenance and scrappage
have been updated with data from a recent UK-based
review (Kay et al. 2013).
Finally, the default electricity generation mix follows
central government projections (mainly natural gas,
wind and nuclear—with some CCS coal and gas by
2030), implying that the carbon content of retail elec-
tricity is gradually decreasing from about 390 gCO2/
kWh in 2015 to about 160 gCO2/kWh in 2030. In the
absence of any government projections beyond 2030,
we have assumed that the carbon content stays constant
at this level out to 2050.
The ‘lifestyle’ (LS) scenario: storyline and travel
demand modelling
Most transport and energy modelling are based on prin-
ciples of cost optimisation (Dodds and McDowall 2014),
utility maximisation of discrete choices or on the princi-
ple that travel-time ‘budgets’ are fixed (Ahmed and
Stopher 2014; Bates 2000). Some notable efforts have
been made to model behavioural factors endogenously at
the level of the wider transport-energy-climate system
(Köhler et al. 2009; Pye and Daly 2015; Tattini et al.
2018; Zimmer et al. 2017). Yet, evidence relating to
Scottish Transport Energy
Air pollution Model (STEAM)
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Fig. 1 Outline of the scenario
modelling approach
Table 1 The four socio-technical scenarios for Scotland
Reference (REF) Lifestyle change (LS)
Projection of transport demand, supply, energy 
use and emissions as if there were no changes to 
existing transport and energy policy
Radical change in travel patterns and mode 
choice leading to relatively fast transformations 
and new demand trajectories
Electric vehicle promotion and 
petrol/diesel ‘phase-out’ (EV)
Combined lifestyle and EV pathway
(LS EV)
Pathway of ‘high electrification’ + phasing out 
of conventional oil based ICVs: range of
measures incl. pricing, taxation, investment, EV 
infrastructure, scrappage/purchase tax on future 
diesel and petrol cars, changing consumer 
preferences
Integration of radical change in travel patterns,
mode choice, high electrification and phasing 
out of conventional petrol and diesel road 
vehicles
REF LS
EV LS EV
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actual travel choices, including vehicle choice, suggests
that social change is strongly influenced by concerns
relating to health, quality of life, energy use and environ-
mental implications. As such, non-price-driven behaviour
(Anable 2005; Cohen et al. 2013; Li et al. 2015; Litman
2017; Schwanen et al. 2011) was deemed to be a domi-
nant driver of energy service demand from transport in
this ‘lifestyle’ scenario.
The lifestyle consumer, including ‘fleet’ or company
consumers, is more aware of the whole cost of travel
(including fixed or sunk costs of owning a vehicle) and
the energy and emissions implications of travel choices.
People become more sensitive to the rapid normative
shifts which alter the bounds of socially acceptable
behaviour, e.g. on ‘binge flying’ (Cohen et al. 2011),
car choice (Barth et al. 2016) and mobility (in)justice
(Mullen and Marsden 2016). Accordingly, the lifestyle
scenario assumed that the focus would shift away from
mobility towards accessibility of services and jobs and
from speed to quality and resilience of journeys. Trig-
gered by worsening conditions (e.g. sensitivity to con-
gestion and air quality concerns) and catastrophic events
(increased frequency of flooding and/or heatwaves),
social norms promote the status of more sustainable
and resilient modes of transport and demote single-
occupancy car travel, fossil fuelled vehicles, unneces-
sarily long distances, speeding and air travel.
More efficient, low-energy and zero energy (non-
motorised) transport systems (e.g. the use of cycling
networks) replace current car-based systems running
on petrol and diesel. New models of Mobility as a
Service (MaaS) (Mulley 2017) and the Sharing Econo-
my (Ritzer and Jurgenson 2010) are embraced. This
includes taxi hailing mobile applications, car clubs7
and the tendency to hire a shared PHEV for longer
distance travel. These are niche markets in which new
vehicle technology is fostered. Information and Com-
munication Technology (ICT: telematics, in-car instru-
mentation, video conferencing, smartcards, e-com-
merce, connected vehicles) facilitates relatively rapid
behavioural change by making cost and energy use
transparent to users. This transparency and enablement
of responsive choices changes everything from destina-
tion choice, substitution of shopping and personal busi-
ness trips by home delivery, car choice and models of
‘ownership’, driving style and paying for travel,
including in the freight sector. As transport and destina-
tion choices become more diverse and widely accessi-
ble, there is increasing acceptance of restrictive local
policies to further accelerate change. It also becomes
socially unacceptable to drive children to school. How-
ever, capacity constraints limit the pace of change so
that mode shift to buses and rail will be moderated.
The new modes and digitalisation, in turn, will result in
a new spatial order towards compact cities, mixed land
uses and self-contained cities and regions. Average dis-
tances travelled are also reduced as distance horizons
change partly from the use of cycling and walking and
partly from a renewed focus on localism (Ferreira et al.
2017). Some services return to rural areas, though moder-
ated by the ability to carry out much personal business
online. The habit of frequent air travel declines as not only
does it become socially unacceptable to fly short distances,
but also airport capacity constraints as well as a ‘frequent
flyer levy’ (Devlin and Bernick 2015) mean that it be-
comes less attractive. Weekends abroad are replaced by
more domestic leisure travel, but this is increasingly carried
out by shared low-carbon vehicles, rail and express coach
and walking and cycling trips closer to home. As a result,
car ownership is lower than in the Reference scenario. An
even more radical change takes place through changes in
work patterns and business travel not only fuelled by
renewed emphasis on quality of life but also facilitated
by increasingly sophisticated ways of substituting
disproportionally impactful long commuting and business
trips by digital technology. The impacts of teleworking and
video conferencing are known to be complex, but recent
studies have highlighted that they could be potentially
important, especially when implemented with the explicit
purpose of reducing transport and energy (Gross et al.
2009; Jones et al. 2018; Scottish Government 2013a).
Increased internet shopping (Çelik 2011; Morganti
et al. 2014; Suel and Polak 2017) and restrictions on
heavy goods vehicles, particularly in town centres, in-
crease the use of vans, which somewhat offsets the
positive effects of decongestion from fewer cars on the
road. There is increased relative decoupling of road
freight from economic activity due to a return to more
localised sourcing (McKinnon 2007), a major shift in the
pattern of consumption to services and products of higher
value, the digitization of media and entertainment, and an
extensive application of new transport-reducing
manufacturing technologies such as 3-D printing
(Birtchnell et al. 2013). There is some shift towards rail
freight and passenger rail from domestic air.
7 In the UK and Scotland, Car clubs are ‘pay as you go’ car hire
schemes known as ‘Car sharing’ in many other European Countries.
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The consequences for travel patterns of these lifestyle
changes were first analysed using the STEAM travel
demandmodel, which took as its starting point the figures
for current individual travel patterns based on Scottish
data in the UK National Travel Survey (Department for
Transport 2016). The Scottish data was analysed so as to
derive figures for each journey purpose (commuting,
travel in the course of work, shopping, education, local
leisure, distance leisure and other) in terms of average
number of trips, average distance (together producing
average journey length). In addition, mode share and
average occupancy were altered based on an evidence
review (e.g. Cairns et al. 2004, 2008; Petrunoff et al.
2015; Scottish Government 2013a) relating to the impact
of transport policies and current variation in travel pat-
terns within and outside Scotland. The ensuing changes
in trip rates, average trip lengths and mode shifts by trip
length are provided in Tables 3 and 4. Key travel indica-
tors are summarised in Table 2.
In estimating what rate and scale of change seems
reasonable, most weight was given to the existing
variation in lifestyle observed in societies similar to Scot-
land, i.e. technologically advanced, liberal democracies.
Whilst Scotland has a relatively low average population
density due to vast expanses of relatively uninhabited
landscape, around 80% of the population live in localities
of and around the country’s five largest urban areas of
Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen, Dundee and Inverness.
Given this predominance of urban and suburban travel, it
seems reasonable to suppose that if a significant fraction
of the population (say 5–10%) somewhere in the OECD
already behave in a particular way, then it is plausible for
this to become a common behaviour in Scotland within
the timeframe to 2050. Careful consideration and a more
conservative approach was used to take account of spe-
cific climate and topographic factors with regard to Scot-
land, and this led to a lower level of ambition than might
have been applied to cycling in particular.
Overall, the Lifestyle scenario implies neither incre-
mental nor step changes in behaviour. It is increasingly
clear that incremental changes in efficiency and behav-
iour will not be effective enough to deliver sustainable
Table 2 Summary results of the combined lifestyle and high EV scenario (LS EV)
2012 2020 2030 2050
Average number of trips (per person per year) 1010 1006 999 955
Average distance travelled (km per person per year) 11,498 11,321 11,029 9845
Avg. car occupancy 1.57 1.58 1.62 1.76
Mode split (% distance)
Cars and motorcycles 74% 71% 61% 41%
Slow modes 3% 4% 8% 17%
Bus and rail 14% 15% 19% 28%
Taxi/‘Uber’, car clubs, other private 2% 3% 4% 7%
Domestic air 7% 6% 6% 6%
‘On-road fuel efficiency’ km affected km affected km affected km affected
Cars, 8% better per km 4% 17% 52% 62%
Vans, 8% better per km 2% 17% 59% 70%
Trucks, 4% better per km 2% 17% 59% 70%
International air demand growth (pa) 1.2% 0.9% 0.5% 0.1%
Vehicle technology choice, e.g. share of new cars by propulsion/fuel 98% ICV petrol/diesel 17% HEV 2% HEV 0% HEV
1% BEV 13% BEV 45% BEV
3% PHEV 53% PHEV 40% PHEV
Direct CO2, reduction over baseline (REF) n/a − 4% − 21% − 47%
Lifecycle CO2e, reduction over baseline (REF) n/a − 5% − 20% − 42%
Cumulative lifecycle CO2e savings (MtCO2e) n/a − 1.9 − 17.4 − 97.2
Direct NOX, reductions over baseline (REF) n/a − 2% − 12% − 38%
Direct PM2.5, reductions over baseline (REF) n/a − 2% − 9% − 34%
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energy systems on their own (CCC 2016; Crompton
2008; Maione et al. 2016). Instead, this Lifestyle sce-
nario outlines far-reaching change leading to relatively
fast transformations and new demand trajectories.
The high electrification pathway (EV)
This scenario combines a transformative pathway de-
veloped for the UK’s Committee on Climate Change
(CCC 2013, 2015). It focuses on supply measures for
plug-in cars and vans as an alternative to fossil fuel
vehicles combined with a purchase tax aimed at phasing
out petrol/diesel vehicles (ICV, HEV but not PHEV) out
of urban areas by 2030. The analysis by the CCC
suggested plug-in vehicle deployment targets for 2020
and 2030 at 9 and 60%, respectively. A small number of
scenarios were run using STEAM in an iterative process
that led to the high electrification pathway. This implied
transformational change including the following: signif-
icant investment and repositioning towards ultra-low
emission vehicles (ULEVs) by the main vehicle manu-
factures with ultra-low emission vehicles (ULEVs) be-
ing available in all car segments (e.g. ‘supermini’, ‘large
family’, ‘crossover’) and by all major brands by 2030;
petrol/diesel cars, vans and buses are gradually phased
out through higher purchase/scrappage taxes, reinforced
by low emission zones and increased parking charges in
cities/towns; and Scotland-wide consumer awareness
and acceptance of ULEV cars by the 2030s driven by
comprehensive awareness campaigns and the ‘neigh-
bour effect’ (Mau et al. 2008). In particular, the fiscal
and regulatory ‘sticks’ are balanced by the carrots of
significant investment in recharging infrastructure
(home charging, fast charging stations in and beyond
Scotland), reduced (perceived) recharging times, and
continued and improved ‘equivalent value support’ (tax-
ation, fuel duty) for ULEVs for both private and
company/fleet buyers.
As for the road freight sector, diesel ICV technology
prevails for much of the scenario period due to the contin-
ued non-availability of gas- and hydrogen-powered vehi-
cles and infrastructure, and the assumed economic and
performance advantage of incumbent technology over
EVs for long distance haulage and distribution. As for
EV trucks, while overhead power supply lines have been
explored in some countries (Germany, France), their de-
ployment may be problematic and uneconomic for a small
country such as Scotland (fewmotorways, dense cities, no
history of trolley buses).
The integrated scenario (LS EV)
This combines radical change in travel patterns, mode
choice, vehicle occupancy and on-road driving behav-
iour (as in LS) with high electrification and phasing out
of conventional petrol and diesel road vehicles (as in
EV). Essentially, lower demand is met by a different
modal and vehicle mix and lower carbon/energy supply.
Results
Impact on travel patterns and vehicle technology
The impact on travel patterns and vehicle technology
choice can be divided into five key areas of transport
energy demands: (1) changing passenger travel patterns,
(2) air travel, (3) freight transport, (4) driving style and
on-road fuel efficiency, and (5) vehicle technology
choice.
Travel patterns change considerably in the lifestyle
scenarios
In the lifestyle scenarios (LS, LS EV), the use of all non-
car surface transport modes increases due to mode shift
to public transport and new mobility services. The dis-
tance travelled by car as a driver or a passenger de-
creases by 52% by 2050, which is a result of significant
mode shifts, particularly to bus travel towards the latter
part of the period (+ 85% for local bus, + 260% for
express coach) and cycling and walking for shorter trips
(trips under 5 mi) in urban areas.Mode shift is combined
with destination shifting, as trips are either fully re-
moved from the system through ‘virtual travel’ or
shorter as a result of localisation.
People increasingly use a multitude of modes in the
lifestyle scenarios (Fig. 2). While in 2030, the car is still
used for the majority of distance travelled as a driver or
passenger (61%), this drops to 40% by 2050. This
reflects the assumption that cars are increasingly banned
or priced out of city/town centres. At the same time,
cycling goes from accounting for less than 1% to more
than 8% of distance travelled, mainly replacing short car
trips under 5 mi. This is similar to levels seen today in
countries regarded as demonstrating best practice in this
area: In 2014, an average Dutch person cycled almost
1000 km per year, corresponding to around 9% of total
distance travelled and a trip mode share of 28%
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(Statistics Netherlands 2016). It also sits well with
Transport Scotland’s target of ‘10% of everyday jour-
neys to be made by bike, by 2020’ (Transport Scotland
2017). It may have been possible to have employed even
greater ambition here given that the Dutch have
achieved this level of cycling already without compre-
hensive banning of conventionally fuelled vehicles from
urban centres proposed in this scenario. If cycling and
walking are added together, ‘slow modes’ account for
17% of distance in 2050.
Air travel
Domestic flights are assumed to saturate and decrease
due to increasing use of much improved intercity rail and
express coaches and a frequent flyer levy (Devlin and
Bernick 2015). Flying becomes a luxury and increasingly
uncompetitive on the basis of time and cost for most
domestic routes as the price increases and rail and coach
travel (taking on road capacity left by less car travel) are
improved. Domestic air-miles in the lifestyle (LS, LS EV)
variants are thus 4 and 21% lower in 2030 and 2050,
respectively, than in the REF and EV cases. Frequent
international air travel is also increasingly becoming un-
acceptable so that air-miles in the lifestyle variants are 4
and 15% lower in 2030 and 2050, respectively.
Freight transport
Driven by the move towards a service economy and
increased use of ‘smart’ home delivery of groceries
and other goods, light commercial vehicle (LCV, i.e.
vans) traffic in a Lifestyle world continues to increase
as it did in the decade prior to 2012, growing by 54% by
2050 over the 2012 levels. However, as LCV technolo-
gy and urban delivery logistics improve, their use is
optimised and average distances travelled per van de-
crease somewhat. Local traffic regulations will give
priority to professional home delivery and consolidated
urban distribution with clean vehicles. Town/city cen-
tres increasingly ban heavy goods vehicles (HGV) but
allow electric delivery vans. As a result, the overall
distance travelled by vans will decrease by 24% by
2050 in the LS and LS EV scenarios when compared
to the REF and EV scenarios. HGVs are still set to grow
(by 8% between 2012 and 2050) due to economic and
population growth, but overall distance travelled by
these vehicles in the LS and LS EV scenarios will fall
by 11 (2030) and 24% (2050) when compared to the
REF and EV scenarios, mainly as a result of increased
load factors through business-led vehicle utilisation
measures and consolidation centres (Hickman and
Banister 2007; Sims et al. 2014). Rail and waterborne
freight play a bigger role, mainly due to mode shift from
roads. These changes implied that the road freight elas-
ticity of demand with respect to GDP decreased from −
0.8 in 2012 (i.e. within the range reported in Dunkerley
et al. (2014)) to − 0.6 in 2050 in REF, whereas it de-
creased further to − 0.3 in the Lifestyle scenarios.
Driving style and on-road fuel efficiency
Efficiency, quality and reliability overtake speed as the
priority for travel in the Lifestyle scenarios. This is brought
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about by higher costs of motoring and the social pressure
to improve driving standards for both safety and environ-
mental reasons. Breaking the speed limit (presently about
half of all motorway driving) becomes socially unaccept-
able as it is seen as wasteful. Elements of partial vehicle
automation ensure speed limit compliance and also steady
driving (Wadud et al. 2016). We assumed that new drivers
will start to practice eco-driving techniques, and for others,
the effectiveness will begin to ‘trail off’, although it is
assumed that the behaviour is reinforced by (a) repeat
training programmes and campaigns (so that it becomes
more or less habitual) and (b) through increased automa-
tion and information feedback in vehicles. Even for those
who are practicing it, not every mile they drive will be
affected. For cars, this increases from 3.6% in 2012 to 41%
in 2025, then levelling off at 62% from 2035. For those
miles affected, an 8% efficiency improvement is assumed,
which is at the lower end of the evidence base (Alam and
McNabola 2014; Gross et al. 2009; Ho et al. 2015; Luijt
et al. 2017). Business uptake of eco-driving is expected to
be quicker as it is easier to integrate training programmes
and instrumentation. Eco-driving will also be practiced by
van and HGV drivers. Diffusion through the van fleet is
expected to mirror that of car business travel, and penetra-
tion through the truck fleet is the same as for vans. How-
ever, the savings per mile are lower (4%), as these vehicles
are already speed limited.
Vehicle technology choice and use
In the EV and LS EV scenarios, private, fleet and com-
mercial buyers increasingly prefer electric vehicles over
conventional internal combustion vehicles, fuelled by a
co-evolving EV market with increasing availability and
performance of lower carbon vehicles, investment in
home and fast recharging infrastructure, and supporting
low carbon pricing policy for ULEVs. Petrol and diesel
ICVs (and later HEVs) are gradually phased out of the
market as cities start banning conventional8 vehicles (in
line with the ban on sales of new conventional petrol and
diesel cars and vans by 2040, HMGovernment 2017) and
favouring EVs through parking and access incentives.
As a result, in both ‘EV’ and ‘LS EV’, conventional
vehicles continue to be the main focus in the short-term
before ULEV (essentially PHEV and BEV) reach ap-
proximately 10% of market share in the early 2020s,
driven by the fleet and early adopter markets. Take-up
by the mass market and so-called ‘user-choosers’
(Brand et al. 2017) in the late 2020s mean that PHEV
car sales reach the 50% mark by 2032 before increas-
ingly better performing BEVs take over as the dominant
choice of vehicle from about 2040, especially for cars
and vans in urban areas. As illustrated for cars in Fig. 3,
while in 2016, only about 2% of new cars were plug-in
vehicles, the EV and LS EV scenarios suggest that by
2030, 63% of new cars could be plug-in vehicles. By
2050, 85% of new cars could be plug-in. HEV sales
remain significant only in the REF (and to some extent
the LS) scenario due to their fuel economy and benefits
(while being slightly more expensive than the ICV
equivalent). Note that the lifestyle scenarios result in
much lower overall car ownership (and therefore sales)
levels in the second half of the assessment period,
reflecting the tendency towards less overall car use,
more use of MaaS and the increased membership of
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car clubs for use of a variety of types of cars for longer
distance journeys.
The changes in overall traffic levels, modal shares and
the increased demand for lower carbon vehicles are fur-
ther illustrated in Figs. 4 (passenger) and 5 (freight),
showing road vehicle traffic on Scottish roads (in billion
vehicle-km) in the ‘REF’ (on the left) and LS EV (on the
right) scenarios. In LS EV, passenger road vehicle-km
decreased considerably (while they increased slightly in
REF), and conventional ICV and HEV technology is
gradually replaced by PHEV and, later, BEV traffic
(Fig. 4). While by 2020, only 1% of car traffic was by
plug-in vehicles, and this share increased rapidly to 8% in
2025, 29% in 2030 and further to a dominating 84% by
2050. Hybrid EV technology peaked at 9.2% of all car
traffic in 2025. Similarly, traffic by HEV buses in LS EV
did not go much beyond 2% of all bus traffic, and zero
emission BEV buses made up 3% of bus traffic in 2020,
rising to 21% in 2030 and 55% in 2050. The rise of
motorcycle traffic reflects the mode shift from car trips.
Overall, road freight increases considerably, even in
LS EV (Fig. 5). Advanced ICV, PHEV and, slightly
later, BEV technologies dominate urban van traffic over
the assessment period. Medium and heavy trucks
continue to be ICV based, with some penetration of
HEVand BEV technology in the later stages.
Impact on transport energy use
Final energy demand is nearly halved in the transport
sector by 2050 in the combined LS EV scenario com-
pared to the reference case (REF) (Fig. 6). Lifestyle
change on its own (i.e. the LS scenario) was much less
effective, reducing transport energy demand by only
14% by 2030 and by 31% by 2050 compared to the
reference case (REF). Nevertheless, reductions were
even lower in the EV technology scenario (EV) at 8
(2030) and 25% (2050) due to travel demand increas-
ing. When compared to baseline (REF), the demand for
conventional fuels (petrol, diesel) was 35% lower in
2050 in the LS scenario and less than half in the com-
bined lifestyle and EV technology case (LS EV). By
comparison, electricity demand grew steeply in both EV
scenarios, rising from its 2012 base of just 1.3% (largely
rail) to around 20% of total fuel demand by 2050 in both
the EV and LS EV scenarios (Fig. 6). Note, however,
that total electricity demand was lower in the LS EV
scenario than the EV scenario, as overall demand was
lower due to lifestyle change.
Note: This shows only gasoline, diesel and electricity based propulsions systems, as none of the alternative propulsion 
systems (B100 ICV, E85 ICV, LPG ICV, CNG ICV, hydrogen FCEV) were taken up significantly enough to show on the 
graph. 
REF LS EV
Fig. 4 Scenario comparison of road passenger traffic by propul-
sion system, ‘REF’ vs. ‘LS EV’. This shows only gasoline, diesel
and electricity-based propulsions systems, as none of the
alternative propulsion systems (B100 ICV, E85 ICV, LPG ICV,
CNG ICV, hydrogen FCEV) were taken up significantly enough to
show on the graph
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Impact on transport carbon emissions
The lifestyle (LS) scenario resulted in 12 and 28% reduc-
tions in direct transport CO2 emissions (i.e. at source) by
2030 and 2050 compared to baseline (REF) levels
(Fig. 7), with reductions over 2012 of 25 (2030) and
46% (2050). This was largely due to reductions from
car emissions, but somewhat offset by increases in bus,
rail and motorcycle emissions due to mode shift. The
techno-centric EV scenario reached similar reductions
only in the second half of the assessment period, largely
due to higher plug-in vehicle shares and zero emissions at
point of use. CO2 emission reductions were greatest in the
combined LS EV scenario, with emissions in 2050 less
than half the level of 2012 and 43% lower than baseline
(REF). Thus, lifestyle change makes the achievement of
Note: This shows only gasoline, diesel and electricity based propulsions systems, as none of the alternative propulsion 
systems (B100 ICV, E85 ICV, LPG ICV, CNG ICV, hydrogen FCEV) were taken up significantly enough to show on the 
graph. 
REF LS EV
Fig. 5 Scenario comparison of road freight traffic by propulsion
system, ‘REF’ vs. ‘LS EV’. This shows only gasoline, diesel and
electricity-based propulsions systems, as none of the alternative
propulsion systems (B100 ICV, E85 ICV, LPG ICV, CNG ICV,
hydrogen FCEV) were taken up significantly enough to show on
the graph
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deep decarbonisation somewhat easier, with fewer chang-
es required to the transport-energy system.
We further assessed life cycle CO2 equivalent (CO2e)
emissions based on the 100-year Global Warming Po-
tential (Allen et al. 2016; Borken-Kleefeld et al. 2013),
which include upstream emissions from power genera-
tion and fuel production, as well as vehicle manufacture,
maintenance and disposal. For the LS scenario, life
cycle carbon emissions were 14 (2030) and 31%
(2050) lower than baseline. This could not be matched
by the technology-led EV scenario, with reductions of 7
(2030) and 22% (2050) compared to baseline.
Finally, when looking at cumulative emissions, the
combined LS EV scenario unsurprisingly saved the
largest amount between 2012 and 2050 (nearly 100
MtCO2e, see also Table 2), followed by the lifestyle
change (72 MtCO2e) and EV technology pathway (41
MtCO2e) scenarios. This is due to the lifestyle change
scenario reducing demand and therefore emissions ear-
lier as well as the implicit lower indirect emissions from
fuel and vehicle production and disposal.
Impact on transport air quality emissions
Strategies designed to promote ULEVs and ‘discour-
age’ petrol and diesel sales for road transport in
Scotland can have significant impacts on air quality
emissions. While all scenarios exhibit a similar
downward trend in the short-term, from the mid-
2020s onwards, direct NOX emissions from all sur-
face transport (road, rail) decreased more in the EV
scenario (− 9% by 2030, − 34% by 2050 when com-
pared to REF) than in the lifestyle scenario (− 4% by
2030, − 20% by 2050 when compared to REF)
(Fig. 8). Direct PM2.5 emissions from surface trans-
port decreased more in the first half of the period for
the technology-led EV scenario (− 5% by 2030) than
in the lifestyle scenario (− 2% by 2030) before show-
ing similar reductions in the second half (− 15% by
2050 for both scenarios). This suggests that in order
to reduce the health burden of road and rail traffic
pollution, the transformation to a cleaner ULEV ve-
hicle fleet may be more effective than demand reduc-
tions and radical mode shift.
Discussion
Key findings
This study found that the carbon budgets set by sub-
national policy in Scotland may only be achieved in
a radical lifestyle and high EV pathway future (LS
EV), as summarised in Table 2. While the results are
plausible, they will be very difficult to achieve with-
out early action and a holistic, integrated approach
as depicted in the LS EV scenario. Even then, the
results suggest that the 1.5C target (that goes beyond
the legally binding 80% target set for the whole
economy) will be very tough to meet in Scotland
without further action on heavy goods vehicles,
international aviation and shipping (where electrifi-
cation is problematic), and further decarbonisation
of the power sector beyond 2030.
The most significant impact of lifestyle change on
the transport-energy system is due to reductions in
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the overall demand for transport energy, particularly
for fossil fuels. Lower transport energy demands
bring benefits for energy system costs, carbon emis-
sions and energy import requirements. Lifestyle
change alone (without an EV transition) has a similar
effect on total transport energy demand to a transition
to EVs with no lifestyle change. This has important
implications for climate mitigation policy. A scenario
that involves lifestyle change will place much less
pressure on policy to require rapid (and potentially
disruptive) technical change, including technologies
at the point of use. This holds true even if the power
sector were to decarbonise further than what has been
assumed in this study beyond 2030.
Of course, the big question is, can it be achieved
on this scale and timescale? Travel demand manage-
ment strategies in Scotland (such as the Smarter
Choices Smarter Places programme), while having a
number of local successes, have failed to deliver
widespread changes in mobility practices to date
(Scottish Government 2013a). Yet, when looking into
the medium to long-term future, we have assumed
nothing extraordinary by looking at best practice in
OECD countries (e.g. ‘going Dutch’ on active travel
in urban areas for certain trip purposes) on trip
lengths and trip rates by trip purpose, mode shift
and occupancy rates, and ULEV uptake and use. By
encouraging lifestyle change, policy is assumed to
co-evolve with and support the main drivers behind
lifestyle change, that is, changes in social norms and
attitudes towards travel, cultural shifts away from
motorisation/mobility to accessibility and an in-
creased emphasis on resilience/less disruption. In
turn, the changing attitudes and norms allow more
radical policies to be implemented: for example, a
ban on binge flying (Cohen et al. 2011), a ‘frequent
flyer levy’ (Devlin and Bernick 2015) and radical car
restraint policies in urban areas (Banister and
Hickman 2013; ECMT 2006). The supporting policy
environment is based around soft measures, e.g.
smarter choices, smarter places, large scale and
sustained awareness campaigns (so that people attri-
bute their own behaviour and transport choices to,
say, climate disasters and high air pollution epi-
sodes), pricing incentives that favour localised trips
and shorter distances, zone/access restrictions, regu-
lation to ‘lock in’ market transformation, and so on.
The same question might also be asked of the rate of
progress on technical change. How achievable are,
say, significant cost reductions for ULEVs and wide-
spread (not just Scotland) investments in charging
infrastructures at home and a reconfiguration of the
existing petrol station network? The latter may in-
clude non-trivial investment in the local electricity
grid infrastructure. Given the scarcity of public funds
to fuel the technology (r)evolution, who will be de-
livering and governing this transition? Hence, the
assumption that encouraging lifestyle change and
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reductions in demand present more problematic is-
sues for policy makers than techno-centric solutions
may not necessarily be correct (Creutzig et al. 2018).
Strength and limitations
The integrated modelling approach allowed us to
place the potential phasing out of petrol and diesel
vehicles and electrification of the car market in the
context of radical changes in travel behaviours on the
basis of their transport, energy and lifecycle emis-
sions impacts. It may therefore have a broader remit
and wider range of applications in scenario and pol-
icy studies than, for instance, the top-down ‘ASIF’
(Schipper 2011) decomposition framework, sectoral
models that lack endogenising consumer behaviour
(Fontes and Pereira 2014; Rogan et al. 2011), or
integrated assessment models that by and large fa-
vour technology solutions and fuel shifts over travel
activity and consumer behaviour modelling (Creutzig
2015; McCollum et al. 2012; Oxley et al. 2013).
However, there are some notable limitations of
this study. The scenario modelling approach used
here is suited to long-term studies of more radical
socio-technical developments. As such, it is simulat-
ing the future rather than predicting it. However, the
forecasting and prediction of the medium to long-
term future beyond, say, 2025 based on historic
values, habits and norms may be inappropriate and
misleading if taken as ‘truth’ (for instance by policy
makers). We believe that the more flexible scenario
approach adopted here of developing structured and
plausible ‘storylines’ and breaking down travel
choices into their constituent journey purposes,
lengths and modes together with a sophisticated
and policy-relevant supply model may be well suit-
ed to initiate debate on social transitions and the
transport and energy policies to support them.
The focus on the subnational level of Scotland (5.4
million inhabitants) may have limitations in terms of
depicting longer-term changes of say travel activity
and vehicle ownership that will manifest differently
according to social and geographical context. We are
therefore developing a geographically (or rather, ad-
ministratively) disaggregate version of STEAM that
models all 32 Local Authority areas in the country.
While allowing for a more refined assessment of
geographical differences, data availability becomes
problematic and cross-border movements an even
more complex issue. Obviously, there are many as-
sumptions behind the quantification of the storylines,
clearly too many to provide in the space of a journal
paper. We have provided the key assumptions and
data and are happy to provide further details on
request. Further work may explore zero carbon and
zero air quality emissions strategies that may go
beyond the radical changes explored in this study.
Conclusion
By going beyond a more traditional techno-centric
approach to carbon and air quality emission mitiga-
tion, this paper presents results of a socio-technical
modelling approach which characterised patterns of
travel behaviour consistent with a more sustainable
society and then ‘pitched’ these against a technolo-
gy, policy and consumer-led high EV pathway. This
necessarily involves ‘what if’ scenario planning,
which is not intended to allow the emergence of a
single vision for the future but rather to challenge
policymakers to consider how to formulate both
‘soft’ and ‘hard’ policies that realise the change
which is required so that the ambitious climate
change and air quality objectives are met.
Given the many uncertainties involved in
decarbonising the transport sector, there are strong ar-
guments for pursuing both demand and supply side
solutions in order to make the path to deep
decarbonisation more sustainable and potentially more
certain. Scottish climate change policy gives more at-
tention to demand-side measures to reduce total
kilometres travelled or shift to less carbon intensive
modes of transport than the UK or other countries. This
paper goes some way to take this further, and faster. The
newfound urgency of ‘cleaning up our act’ since the
Paris Agreement and Dieselgate scandal suggests that
we cannot just wait for the ‘technology fix’.
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Table 3 Passenger travel demand indicators, lifestyle scenarios (LS and LS EV)
2012 2020 2030 2040 2050 Comment/source
Number of trips
Commuting, reduction due
to teleworking
3% 4% 5% 10% 15% The uptake in teleworking is reinforced by tax incentives,
travel plans, broadband-roll-out and road user charges
and parking charges
Business travel, reduction
due to tele/video conferencing
5% 6% 8% 17% 25% Going Smarter report (Scottish Government 2013)
concludes that tele/video conferencing could reduce
business trips by 18% after 10 years. Extrapolate this
on to reach 25% maximum reduction in trips by 2050
on the basis that there are many business trips e.g.
nursing which cannot and simply will not be avoided.
TC share in 2012 is assumed to be 5%. These
proportional reductions will also apply to air trips
Local leisure, increase due to
shift to more local trips
0% 1% 3% 7% 10% There is a general shift in all age groups towards more
local leisure trips for at the expense of longer trips,
so a small increase is assumed due to this effect
Long distance leisure in
Scotland, increase due to
holidaying at home
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% Fewer people travelling abroad means more domestic
holidays—however, the increase in weekends away
will be neutralised by fewer distance day trips (due to
affordability as price of travel increases) with people
using their local area more instead
Shopping, increase due to more
walking and cycling
0% 2% 5% 8% 10% Based on figures in Going Smarter report (Scottish
Government 2013a)
Shopping, reduction due
to teleshopping
0% 1% 3% 7% 10% Going Smarter report (Scottish Government 2013a)
suggests that home shopping could reduce vehicle
mileage for shopping by 4% after 10 years. Here,
we assume 3% trips by 2030 and 10% by 2050.
(However, there will be an effect on van use.)
Other trips, decrease due
to tele-activity
0% 1% 3% 8% 12% It will increasingly be the norm to access many services
such as banking and medical care on-line
Trip length
Commuting, reduction due
to more teleworking
0% 1% 2% 4% 6% Teleworking abstracts the longer commute trips and
therefore has a disproportionately large impact on
average trips lengths
Commuting, reduction due
to proximity principle
0% 1% 3% 9% 15% The proximity principle assumes that there is a movement
towards living closer work places
Business travel, reduction
due to more tele/video
conferencing
0% 1% 3% 9% 15% Assumed that the longest trips are increasingly
substituted by tele-video conferencing
Long distance leisure,
more weekends away
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% There are fewer day trips and more people cycling and
walking from home but some longer holiday trips
(weekends away) to replace travel abroad—means that
on balance average distance stays the same
Local leisure, switch to
local W&C trips
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% Although there is a shift towards walking and cycling
around the local area, this does not reduce the average
length of local leisure trips. With leisure, it is mainly
modes that change, not the number or length of trips
School, reduction due to
proximity principle
0% 1% 3% 9% 15% School selection policy is revised to insist that ‘local
schools’ are chosen
Shopping, reduction due to
more local shopping
0% 2% 5% 10% 15% Restriction of cars in urban areas means that shorter,
local journeys become more attractive
Other trips, reduction due
to proximity principle
0% 1% 3% 9% 15% Re-introduction of local clinics, post office/banking
services, etc. especially in rural areas. Restriction
of cars in urban areas means that shorter, local journeys
become more attractive
Appendix
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Table 4 Mode shift by trip length, lifestyle scenarios (LS and LS EV)
Trip length Mode shift 2020 2030 2050
0–1 mi From car/van driver to walk 2% 8% 20%
From car/van driver to bicycle 1% 5% 13%
From car/van driver to local bus 1% 3% 8%
From car/van passenger to walk 2% 8% 20%
From car/van passenger to bicycle 1% 3% 8%
From car/van passenger to local bus 1% 3% 8%
From local bus to walk 1% 5% 13%
From local bus to bicycle 1% 3% 8%
1–2 mi From car/van driver to walk 3% 10% 25%
From car/van driver to bicycle 1% 5% 13%
From car/van driver to motorcycle 0% 1% 2%
From car/van driver to local bus 1% 3% 8%
From car/van passenger to walk 3% 10% 25%
From car/van passenger to bicycle 1% 5% 13%
From car/van passenger to motorcycle 0% 1% 2%
From car/van passenger to local bus 1% 3% 8%
From local bus to walk 1% 5% 13%
From local bus to bicycle 1% 3% 8%
2–5 mi From car/van driver to walk 1% 5% 13%
From car/van driver to bicycle 1% 5% 13%
From car/van driver to motorcycle 0% 1% 2%
From car/van driver to local bus 1% 5% 13%
From car/van passenger to walk 1% 4% 10%
From car/van passenger to bicycle 1% 4% 10%
From car/van passenger to motorcycle 0% 1% 2%
From car/van passenger to local bus 1% 5% 13%
From local bus to bicycle 1% 5% 13%
From rail/underground to bicycle 1% 5% 13%
5–10 mi From car/van driver to bicycle 1% 3% 8%
From car/van driver to motorcycle 0% 1% 2%
From car/van driver to local bus 2% 8% 20%
From car/van driver to rail/underground 1% 3% 8%
From car/van driver to MaaS 1% 5% 13%
From car/van passenger to bicycle 1% 2% 5%
From car/van passenger to motorcycle 0% 1% 2%
From car/van passenger to local bus 1% 5% 13%
From car/van passenger to rail/underground 1% 3% 8%
From car/van passenger to MaaS 1% 3% 8%
10–25 mi From car/van driver to bicycle 1% 2% 5%
From car/van driver to motorcycle 0% 1% 2%
From car/van driver to express coach 1% 5% 13%
From car/van driver to rail/underground 3% 10% 25%
From car/van driver to MaaS 2% 8% 20%
From car/van passenger to bicycle 0% 1% 3%
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